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Abstract
At a natural rate of unemployment and a frozen capital stock
early monetarist and New Classical supply-side equilibria found
the natural supply of goods to be Immune to monetary and fiscal
policy.
The present paper considers three forms of capital stock.
First a human capital stock of accumulated flows of education.
Second a knowledge capital stock of accumulated flows of R & D.
Third a conventional capital stock of accumulated flows of
physical Investment. The paper unfreezes all three forms and
finds physical output far from Immune to monetary and fiscal
policy.
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I . INTRODUCTION
The original Solow (1956) growth model knew only
conventional physical capital stock. Technological progress was
exogenous, falling as manna from heaven and blowing up the entire
production function. The model was a standing invitation to
endogenize technological progress. After all know-how can be
created by R & D and disseminated by education.
Recent literature has accepted the invitation. Griliches
(1973), (1979), (1988) saw a knowledge capital of accumulated
R&D and estimated its productivity. The most recent estimate is
Lichtenberg-Siegel (1991). Kendrick (1976) saw one-half of the
1969 U.S. capital stock as a human capital stock of accumulated
education. The most recent estimate of its productivity is
Mankiw-Romer-Weil (1990).
The present paper sees recent literature in a theoretical
perspective. The original Solow model is extended to include
three forms of capital stock. First a human capital stock of
accumulated flows of education. Second a knowledge capital stock
of accumulated flows of R & D. Third a conventional capital stock
of accumulated flows of physical investment. In the Solow
tradition all three are considered immortal. Investment in human
capital is public. Investment in knowledge and physical capital
is private and optimized by maximizing present net worth, hence
can be crowded out by an interest mechanism.
The model is simple enough to be solved for its levels and
its growth rates. Solutions are found to be sensitive to monetary
and fiscal policy.
II. THE MODEL
1. Variables
C s consumption
D = demand for money
E = flow of education
G = government purchase of goods
g = proportionate rate of growth
H s stock of human capital
I s flow of physical investment
J = flow of R & D investment
K = stock of knowledge capital
k = present gross worth of another unit of knowledge capital
k = marginal productivity of knowledge capital stock
L s labor employed
P s price of good
R = tax revenue
r s before-tax nominal rate of interest
p = aftertax real rate of interest
S = stock of physical capital
s present gross worth of another unit of physical capital
a = marginal productivity of physical capital stock
v s money salary rate
w = money wage rate
X = physical output
Y s money national income
y money disposable income
2. Parameters
a = joint factor productivity
a, 13, Y/ 5 = exponents of a Cobb-Douglas production function
b = a demand parameter
c s propensity to consume
T| = reciprocal of Marshallian price elasticity of demand
F = available labor force
f s fraction of government purchase allocated to education
X = "natural" employment rate
M s supply of money
m = reciprocal of the velocity of money
T = tax rate
All parameters are stationary except a, F, and M, whose
growth rates are stationary.
3. Definitions
Define the proportionate rate of growth of variable v as
dlog9v
* v dt
Human capital stock H is accumulated investment E in
education. Knowledge capital stock K is accumulated investment J
in R & D. Conventional capital stock S is accumulated physical
investment I. Consequently under immortal capital stocks:
E = g„H (2)
J = gKK ( 3 )
I5 ?SS (4)
4. Product
Like a Solow economy our economy produces a single good but
makes alternative uses of it. Regardless of its use let the good
be produced in the same way under a Cobb-Douglas production
function common to all firms
X = aLaAV (5)
where a, 13, y, and 6 are positive proper fractions summing to one
and where a is joint factor productivity growing at the rate ga .
Such a linearly homogeneous production function rules out
nonpure competition rooted in economies of scale but not nonpure
competition rooted in product differentiation. R&D creates
productivity advantages to be enjoyed within niches sheltered from
rivals. Within such niches let all firms imagine themselves
facing the same constant-elasticity demand function
P = bX*
8where > t| > -1 is the reciprocal of a Marshallian price
elasticity of demand. Our solutions will display the factor
0<l + n. < 1 to be thought of as a measure of the degree of
competition in the goods market. Under pure competition firms
cannot control price, and the equality sign holds: 1 + r| =1.
The less pure competition in the goods market is, the lower the
factor 1 + r\ .
5. Demand for Labor
Let labor be hired at the money wage rate w. A firm will
maximize its aftertax profits by equating the money wage rate with
the marginal-revenue productivity of labor hired:
v= (1 + t\)p££
oL
Differentiate, rearrange, and write firm demand for labor as
a function of the real wage rate:
L o(l + r\)X/ {w/P) ( 6 )
As Lindbeck-Snower (1989: 373) observed, firms facing the
same production function, demand function, and factor prices will
behave alike, i.e., decide on the same factor use and physical
output. In that case the demand for labor (6) is easily
aggregated.
6. Supply of Labor. The "Natural" Real Wage Rate
Facing such aggregate demand for labor (6), how much do
unions choose to supply? Friedman's answer (1968) was his
"natural" rate of unemployment to which current labor-market
literature adds institutional color: Lindbeck and Snower (1986)
and Blanchard and Summers (1988) distinguish between "insiders,"
who are employed hence decision-making, and "outsiders," who are
unemployed hence disenfranchised. Let insiders accept the
"natural" employment rate X where < X < 1. We may think of the
rate X as a measure of the degree of competition in the labor
market: under pure competition unions cannot control real wage
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rates, and the equality sign holds, X 1. The less pure
competition in the labor market is, the lower the rate X.
The rate X is "natural" in the sense that if L > XF insiders
will insist on a higher real wage rate. If
L=\F (7)
they will be happy with the existing one. If L < XF they will
settle for a lower one.
Given their natural rate of employment, insiders will be
happy with a "natural" real wage rate found by inserting (7) into
(6):
w/P = a(l + i\)X/[XF) ( 8 )
At frozen capital stocks H, K, and S, X would decline in
less than proportion to X, and labor can have a higher natural
real wage rate by accepting a lower X.
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7. Demand for Services of Human Capital
Let services of human capital be hired at the money salary-
rate v. A firm will maximize its aftertax profits by equating the
money salary rate with the marginal-revenue productivity of
services hired:
v- d-nfpjf
Differentiate, rearrange, and write firm demand for services
of human capital as a function of the real salary rate:
H « P(l + t))X/(v/P) ( 9 )
Again firms facing the same production function, demand
function, and factor prices will decide on the same factor use and
physical output, and demand for services of human capital (9) is
easily aggregated.
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8. Supply of Services of Human Capital, Real Salary Rate
Human capital stock H is accumulated flows of investment E
in education, and the flow of education is decided upon by the
government. Let the market for services of human capital be
clearing at whatever human capital has accumulated— in sec. 10
below we shall see how much. Find the resulting real salary rate
by rearranging (9):
v/P = P(l + r\)X/H ( 10 )
9. Knowledge and Physical Capital Stocks
Private Optimization
Knowledge and physical capital stocks K and S are privately
optimized. We begin with their marginal productivities
13
= dX _ „ XK5 j*=^ (id
.§-«| d2)
Their marginal-revenue productivities will then be
(1 + t| )kP and (1 + r\)aP, respectively. Such marginal-revenue
productivities of immortal capital stocks will be marginal net
returns taxed at rate T. Let nominal interest expense be tax-
deductible, then money may be borrowed at an aftertax nominal rate
of interest (1 - T)r. Discount future cash flows at that rate.
Define present gross worths k and s of another unit of knowledge
or physical capital stock, respectively, as the present worth at
time t of all its future aftertax marginal-revenue productivities
fc(x) = /" (1 + n)(l - T)<(t)P(t)e~ a T)r(t " x) dt
T
six) 5 /* (1 + n)U - T)a(t)P(t)e~ (l ' T)Ht T) dt
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In (38) we shall see that gK = gs = gx and in (40) that
price is growing at the stationary rate gp . Consequently
K(t) - K(T)
a(t) - o(t)
gP& - t)
P(t) - P(t)e
Define the aftertax real rate of interest
p = (1 - T)i - gp (13)
Insert all this into k(r) and s(t), move (1 + r\) , (1 - T),
k(t), a(r) , and P(t) outside the integral signs, assume p > 0, and
take the integrals
k - (1 + r\\ (1 - DkP/p
s = (l + ti) (l - DoP/p
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Present net worth of another unit of capital stock is its
present gross worth minus its price. In our one-good economy that
price is P, so
k - P - [(1 + i)) (1 - Dk/p - l] P
s - P = [(l + ti) (l - Do/p - 1]P
Optimized capital stock is the size of stock at which the
present net worth of another unit is zero:
(1 + ti) (1 - T)k = p ( 14 >
(1 + il) (1 - Do - p (15)
from which we see that k = a: at their optimized sizes knowledge
and physical capital stocks have equal marginal productivities.
To find those sizes insert (11) and (12) into (14) and (15),
respectively:
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JT- y(l + 1|) (1 - T)X/p (16)
S = 5(1 + r\) (1 - DJf/p (17)
Again factor uses (16) and (17) are easily aggregated.
Divide such aggregated (16) by (17) and see that K/S = y/& hence
STx-ffs < 18 >
We turn to human capital stock, decided by government.
10. Human Capital Stock: Public Finance
With immortal capital stocks national income is the market
value of physical output
Y =PX (19)
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Such national income is taxed at rate T, so tax revenue is
R = TY (20)
where < T < 1. As a first approximation let government finance
a deficit by increasing the money supply. The government budget
constraint then collapses into
GP - R = gHM (21)
As a first approximation [Friedman (1959)] let the demand
for money be a function of money national income but not of the
rate of interest:
D = mY (22)
where m > 0. Let the money market clear:
M=D (23)
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Into (21) insert (19), (20), (22), and (23) and find what
purchase of goods the government can afford:
G = (T * gMm)X (24)
Let the government allocate the fraction f of it to
education:
B-fG (25)
Into (2) insert (24) and (25) and find human capital stock
H = f(T+ gHm)X/gH (26)
11. Consumption
Define disposable income as national income minus tax
revenue:
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y =y- R (27)
and let consumption be the fraction c of disposable real income:
C = cy/P ( 28 )
where < c < 1. Into (28) insert (19), (20), and (27):
C = c(l - T)X ( 29 )
12 . Goods-Market Clearance
The single good of our one-good economy was consumed,
invested in physical or knowledge capital, or purchased by
government. Let the goods market clear:
A-=C+J+J-+G ( 3 °)
We may now solve our system.
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III. SOLUTIONS
1. Levels
The goods market is cleared by the aftertax real rate of
interest. Into (30) insert (3), (4), (16), (17), (18), (24), and
(29) and solve for the aftertax real rate of interest:
p = (y + 6) (1 + i|) (l - T)/A, where
a
, (1 - c) (1 - T) - gMm (31)
9s
Into (16) and (17) insert our solution (31). Into (5)
insert the result and (7) and (26) and solve for physical output
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X = al/V^^C^V + V^°, where
B =f(r+ gM^)/grH (32)
Once we have solved for X the rest is easy. Solve for the
sum of knowledge and physical capital by inserting (31) into the
sum of (16) and (17):
K + 5 = AX ( 33 )
Solve for human capital by writing (26) as
H-BX < 34 >
The real wage rate was
w/P = a(l + i\)X/(XF) < 8 >
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Solve for price by inserting (19) into (22) and (23):
P = M/(mX) (35)
Solve for the real salary rate by inserting (26) into (10):
v/P = (3(1 + r\)/B (36)
2 . Growth Rates
All parameters were said to be stationary except a, F,
and M. Consequently the growth rates of our levels (8) and (31)
through (36) will be
gp = (37)
9H = 9K = 9S = 9X = 9
J
-
+ 9? < 38)
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9v/P = 9a/* (39)
9P = 9m~ (9a/* + 9F) ( 4°)
^v/p = (41)
3. Growth Accounting
Let an original two-factor Solow model have factor exponents
0.8 for labor and 0.2 for capital. Let its joint factor
productivity, its labor, and its capital be growing at 0.016,
0.01, and 0.03, respectively. Then its output would be growing at
0.03, of which the exogenous growth rate 0.016 of joint factor
productivity, left unexplained, would be 53 percent.
Adding endogenous human and knowledge capital we may sharply
reduce that unexplained part. Under the not implausible values of
table I physical output would be growing at the rate gx =
ga + ag F + 3gH + Y9K + 5gs 0.03 as before. But of gx = 0.03,
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TABLE I. NOT IMPLAUSIBLE VALUES
Parameters
a = 0.4
fl = 0.4
Y = 0.1
5 = 0.1
1 - c = 0.08
f = 0.25
g a = 0.008a
g F = 0.01
gM =0.06
m = 0.2
T = 0.25
Variables
9 H
= 9K = 9S = 9X =0.03
gH/P =0.02
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ga = 0.008 would be only 27 percent. The unexplained part has
been cut in half!
IV. PROPERTIES OF SOLUTIONS
1. Will Levels be Positive and Finite?
All levels (8) and (31) through (35) contain A and will be
positive and finite as long as A > 0. Tobin's (1986) "debacle"
will result if A = 0, i.e., if the deficit share gMm of national
income swallows up the savings share (1 - c)(l - T) . In that case
physical output, all capital stocks, and the real wage rate will
turn zero. The aftertax real rate of interest and price will turn
undefined and have the limits
limp = limP = »
A - A -
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2. A Crowding-Out Mechanism
Capital coefficients are the clue to crowding-out and are
apparent in (33) and (34). The "private" capital coefficient is
A, and A is always down when gM or T is up: dA/8gM = -m/gs < 0;
dA/dT = -(1 - c)/g
s
< 0. The "public" capital coefficient is B,
and B is always up when gM or T is up: 3B/dgM = fm/g H > 0;
dB/dT = f/^H > ®* Per un ^-t °^ output, then, public capital is
crowding out private capital.
The crowding-out mechanism is now easy to see: the cost of
capital is the aftertax real rate of interest (31), always up when
gM or T is up.
3. Supply-Side Equilibrium
Early supply-side equilibria by Friedman (1968), Lucas
(1972), Sargent (1973), and Sargent-Wallace (1975) were static
equilibria: capital stock remained frozen. At such frozen
capital stock and a "natural" rate of unemployment physical output
would be immune to monetary and fiscal policy.
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We have unfrozen all our three capital stocks and made them
endogenous. We find no immunity to monetary and fiscal policy:
physical output (32) may go either way when gM or T is up.
Physical output depends both on A, which is down, and on B, which
is up. And A comes with the exponent (y + 6) /a and B with the
exponent J3/a. Estimates of such exponents offered in recent
literature by Griliches, Lichtenberg-Siegel, Mankiw-Romer-Weil,
and others are crucial.
Which way physical output (32) will go is described by the
signs of its two elasticities
dX 9M _ 1$ f
_
y + & 1 \ 9tim (42)
dgM X ' \ a B a
" A } gs
dXT ./ P £ _ y + 5 1 - c \ T (43)
dT X \ a B a A f g3
At the not implausible parameter values of table I the
elasticity (42) will be -0.08 and the elasticity (43) 0.75. Why
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should the effect of monetary policy be negative but the effect of
fiscal policy positive?
First compare the effects of monetary and fiscal policy
upon A. At the parameter values of table I the elasticity of A is
-0.25 with respect to gM and -0.42 with respect to T. In other
words a one percent higher tax rate T will have a 1.7 times more
powerful (negative) effect upon A than would a one percent higher
Second compare the effects of monetary and fiscal policy
upon B. At the parameter values of table I the elasticity of B is
0.046 with respect to gM and 0.95 with respect to T. In other
words a one percent higher tax rate T will have a 21 times more
powerful (positive) effect upon B than would a one percent higher
In short, the chance that its positive effect upon the
"public" capital coefficient B will swamp its negative effect upon
the "private" capital coefficient A is better for fiscal than for
monetary policy.
Two essential propositions of a supply-side equilibrium did
survive. The first was the immunity of employment (7) to public
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policy. The second was the working of an interest and price
mechanism. As we saw, the labor market may not clear: there was
a natural rate of employment < X < 1. But two equilibrating
variables, i.e., the aftertax real rate of interest p and price P
did clear the goods and money markets (30) and (23), respectively.
One last thing. Our model assumed competition to be
nonpure. Was nonpure competition of any consequence?
4. Nonpure Competition in the Goods Market
Our factor prices (8), (31), and (36) are in direct
proportion to 1 + T| hence are the lower the less pure competition
is in the goods market. No other level has any 1 + r\ in it.
Less pure competition, then, merely depresses factor prices
but has no effect upon factor use (7), (33), or (34) or upon
physical output (32). Less pure competition simply redistributed
income in favor of entrepreneurs at the expense of wage and salary
earners and capitalists. Such redistribution may be seen as the
result of successful R&D.
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5. Nonpure Competition in the Labor Market
Factor use (7), (33), and (34) and physical output (32) are
in direct proportion to X hence are the lower the less pure
competition is in the labor market. Price (35) is in inverse
proportion to physical output X, hence to X and is the higher the
less pure competition is in the labor market. No other level has
any X in it.
Such invariance of factor prices (8), (31), and (36) with X
sheds new light on union policy. As we observed in (8), at frozen
capital stocks H, K, and S labor could have a higher real wage
rate by accepting a lower natural rate X of employment. In the
long run, i.e., at unfrozen capital stocks H, K, and S, X is in
direct proportion to X, the natural rate X will cancel in (8), and
labor can have a no higher natural real wage rate by accepting a
lower X. The economy is simply reduced to a lower scale:
accumulating proportionately less capital stock and producing
proportionately less output. The economy is impoverishing itself.
Labor doesn't benefit, nobody benefits.
HB.3-10
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